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The Lerner index and revenue maximization
Laura Spierdijk and Michalis Zaouras
Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, University of Groningen, Groningen,
The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Based on profit-maximizing behaviour, the usual interpretation of the Lerner index is that a zero
value reflects competitive behaviour, while a positive value is associated with market power. We
investigate to what extent the usual interpretation of the Lerner index remains valid in a setting
where firms do not pursue profit maximization, but instead maximize revenues subject to a
minimum-profit constraint. We show that a positive Lerner index still indicates market power, but
that the magnitude of a positive Lerner index can no longer be used to determine how much
market power there is. Furthermore, extra information would be required to draw conclusions
about the presence or absence of market power when the Lerner index is zero or negative. We
discuss the empirical implications of our results.
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Because the degree of competition among the firms
in a sector or industry has important welfare impli-
cations for both consumers and firms (e.g. Bikker
2004), the assessment of firms’ market power is the
topic of many theoretical and empirical studies in
the economic literature.
Measures of market power often rely on the
assumption of profit-maximizing behaviour (e.g.
Hay and Liu 1997; Shaffer 2004; Boone 2008;
Bikker, Shaﬀer, and Spierdijk 2012). However,
Baumol (1958) already argued that firms in oligopo-
listic markets are more likely to maximize revenues
subject to a minimum-profit constraint rather than
to pursue profit maximization; a theory for which
the early literature found some empirical evidence
(e.g. Amihud and Kamin 1979; Winn and Shoenhair
1988). More recently, Segerson and Squires (1995)
argued that the appropriate short-run behavioural
assumption for a multi-product firm is revenue max-
imization. Other alternative pricing strategies that
have been considered in the literature are limit pri-
cing (Milgrom and Roberts 1982) and constant
mark-up pricing (Rosse and Panzar 1977).
A widely used measure of market power is the
Lerner index, whose theoretical and historical foun-
dation has been extensively discussed in the
literature (e.g. Landes and Posner 1981; Elzinga
and Mills 2011; Giocoli 2012). The Lerner index
compares a firm’s output price with its associated
marginal costs, where marginal cost pricing is
referred to as the ‘social optimum that is reached
in perfect competition’ (Lerner 1934, 168). The stan-
dard interpretation of the Lerner index is that a zero
value reflects competitive behaviour, while a positive
value is associated with market power. However, this
interpretation is directly derived from profit-
maximizing behaviour, as we will see later.
This leads to the fundamental question to what
extent the usual interpretation of the Lerner index
remains valid in a setting where firms do not pursue
profit maximization. As argued by Cairns (1995), a
measure of market power ‘[…] should be able to
provide a meaningful summary measure of mono-
poly power in any situation, not just that in which
the firm is maximizing profits somehow defined.’ If
the common interpretation is no longer valid in the
absence of profit-maximizing behaviour, this will
have stark implications for empirical studies using
the Lerner index. Such studies do not test whether
firms actually pursue profit maximization, but rely
on the standard interpretation of the Lerner index
anyhow (e.g. Ferna´Ndez De Guevara and Maudos
2004; Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk 2012).
The supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.
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The goal of this study is to investigate whether the
interpretation of the Lerner index as a measure of
market power is robust to deviations from the profit-
maximization paradigm. We focus on revenue max-
imization as alternative pricing strategy because of
two reasons. First, its empirical relevance has already
been pointed out by, e.g., Segerson and Squires
(1995). Second, revenue maximization subject to a
minimum-profit constraint encompasses several
limiting cases, including sales maximization subject
to a break-even constraint, and even profit maximi-
zation. This makes it a convenient and fairly general
framework to analyse.
Our main results are as follows. When firms max-
imize revenues subject to a minimum-profit con-
straint, we can safely conclude that they possess
market power when the Lerner index is significantly
positive. However, we can no longer use themagnitude
of the Lerner index to determine how much market
power they have. Furthermore, additional information
would be required to draw conclusions about the pre-
sence or absence of market power when the Lerner
index is zero or negative. In particular, without such
information, we can no longer conclude that a zero
Lerner index implies the absence of market power. We
show that statistical tests for profit maximization
(Varian 1984; Love and Shumway 1994) can contribute
to a correct interpretation of the Lerner index.
II. The Lerner index under profit maximization
We consider a profit-maximizing firm with a single-
output production technology. Let PðqÞ denote the
inverse demand function satisfying P0ðqÞ  0 for
q > 0. Furthermore, let CðqÞ denote total production
costs as a function of output, with corresponding
marginal cost function MCðqÞ > 0 for q > 0. The
Lerner index is defined as a firm’s relative mark-up
of the output price over marginal cost, given the
firm’s output level q > 0:
LðqÞ ¼ PðqÞ MCðqÞ
PðqÞ : (1)
Under profit maximization, LðqÞ ¼ ε1d ðqÞ. Here
q is the profit-maximizing output quantity and
ε1d ðqÞ ¼ P0ðqÞq=PðqÞ the firm’s inverse price
elasticity of demand evaluated in q (Lerner 1934, 169).
We have LðqÞ  0, while LðqÞ < 1 for any q > 0.
Under profit maximization we can thus distinguish
competitive (εd ¼ 1) from uncompetitive
(εdðqÞ < 1) behaviour on the basis of the sign of the
Lerner index. Furthermore, the value of the Lerner index
is monotonically associated to market power.
Lerner (1934, 170) suggested that the relative differ-
ence between the observed price and marginal cost can
always be used to assess a firm’s market power, even in
the absence of profit maximization. This suggestion
has been adopted by the empirical literature in many
fields of study, where the Lerner index is widely viewed
as a standard tool to assess a firm’s market power
regardless of the firm’s objective function.
However, the equality in PðqÞ  MRðqÞ ¼
MCðqÞ does no longer hold in the absence of profit
maximization. Consequently, in such a scenario, the
Lerner index may become zero or even negative in
the presence of market power. We will investigate
the implications for the interpretation of the Lerner
index in the next section.
III. The Lerner index under revenue
maximization
We assume that a firmmaximizes revenues subject to a
minimum-profit constraint (Baumol 1958; Kafoglis
and Bushnell 1970). This section characterizes the
optimal output of a revenue maximizing firm and
considers the measurement of market power by
means of the Lerner index.
Characterization of optimal output
We assume that the following conditions hold,
for π0  0:
Assumption 1
(i) πð0Þ < π0.
(ii) MRðqÞ ¼ P0ðqÞqþ PðqÞ  0 for q > 0.
(iii) MCðqÞ > 0 for q > 0.
(iv) The profit function πðÞ is concave with the
unique profit-maximizing output level q and
maximum profit level πmax ¼ πðqÞ.
For a given minimum-profit level π0  0, the
firm’s optimization problems equals






























s:t: πðqÞ ¼ PðqÞq CðqÞ  π0: (3)
We notice that π0 ¼ 0 corresponds to revenue
maximization subject to a break-even constraint
and πmax to profit maximization.
The necessary conditions for an optimal solu-
tion are summarized below, which is an extension
of Kafoglis and Bushnell (1970) because it
includes the cases that μðπ0Þ ¼ 0 and μðπ0Þ ¼ 1.
Result 1 Under Assumptions 1 (i) – (v), if there is a
solution ~q ¼ ~qðπ0Þ to the firm’s optimization pro-
blem, it must satisfy ~q > 0 and the following first-
order condition:
P0ð~qÞ~qþ Pð~qÞ ¼ μðπ0Þ
1þ μðπ0ÞMCð~qÞ; (4)
for the Kuhn–Tucker multiplier 0  μðπ0Þ  1.
Proof: The Kuhn–Tucker conditions for the firm’s
optimal output ~q are
P0ð~qÞ~qþ Pð~qÞ ¼  μðπ0Þ½P0ð~qÞ~qþ Pð~qÞ
MCð~qÞ; ½optimality
(5)
Pð~qÞ~q Cð~qÞ  π0  0; ½feasibility (6)
μðπ0Þ½Pð~qÞ~qCð~qÞπ0 ¼ 0;
½complementary slackness (7)
μðπ0Þ  0; (8)
~q  0: (9)
Because πð0Þ < π0, we must have ~q > 0. We
can rewrite Condition (5) as
P0ð~qÞ~qþ Pð~qÞ  μðπ0Þ
1þ μðπ0ÞMCð~qÞ ¼ 0: (10)
Case 1: If MRð~qÞ > 0, Equation (10) implies that
μðπ0Þ > 0. To show that μðπ0Þ ¼ 1 is possible, assume
that εd < 1 and π0 ¼ πmax. To prove that ~q ¼ q is a
solution such that μðπmaxÞ ¼ 1, we have to verify
feasibility and optimality. Evidently,
PðqÞq  CðqÞ  πmax ¼ 0. Furthermore, Equation
(10) is satisfied for ~q ¼ q and μðπmaxÞ ¼ 1 because
MRðqÞ ¼ MCðqÞ under profit maximization. It is
straightforward to verify that also competitive behaviour
(εd ¼ 1, P ¼ MC) yields a solution with μðπ0Þ ¼ 1.
Case 2: If MRð~qÞ ¼ 0, then we must have μðπ0Þ ¼ 0
because of Equation (10) and MCð~qÞ > 0. With
μðπ0Þ ¼ 0, Condition (7) implies that the minimum-
profit constraint is not binding. Because MRð~qÞ ¼ 0
and MCð~qÞ > 0, this case thus excludes profit maximi-
zation and competitive behaviour for which
MR ¼ MC > 0. □
An implication of Result 1 is that
MRð~qÞ < MCð~qÞ and Pð~qÞ < PðqÞ for μðπ0Þ < 1.
The Lerner index and market power
Given the optimal output level ~q under revenue-
maximizing behaviour subject to a minimum-profit
level, we can rewrite the associated Lerner index on
the basis of Equation (10) as





It is readily seen that Lð~qÞ  ε1d ð~qÞ, with strict
inequality for μðπ0Þ < 1. We thus observe that
Lð~qÞ  0 under competitive conditions (εd ¼ 1).
More specifically, we find Lð~qÞ < 0 for εd ¼ 1 and
0  μðπ0Þ < 1, while Lð~qÞ ¼ 0 for εd ¼ 1 and
μðπ0Þ ¼ 1. Both Lð~qÞ < 0 and Lð~qÞ > 0 can arise
under uncompetitive conditions. Using a similar
continuity argument as Bikker, Shaﬀer, and
Spierdijk (2012), it follows that Lð~qÞ ¼ 0 is also
possible under uncompetitive conditions. The online
appendix with supplementary material provides spe-
cific examples to illustrate that Lð~qÞ < 0, Lð~qÞ ¼ 0
and Lð~qÞ > 0 are indeed possible under uncompeti-
tive conditions, and that Lð~qÞ  0 under competitive
conditions.
Empirical implications
The main implication of our results is that, under
revenue maximization subject to a minimum-profit
constraint, we can only use the Lerner index as a
one-sided test for market power in the following
sense. Given an empirical estimate of L (denoted
L^), we distinguish two cases. If statistical tests show
that L^ is significantly positive, we conclude that there
is market power. However, we can no longer use the
magnitude of a positive Lerner index to determine
how much market power there is. This happens





























because the Lerner index’ competitive benchmark
value is no longer 0 (instead, non-positive values
may arise in competitive cases). If L^ is not signifi-
cantly different from 0 or significantly negative, we
can draw no conclusions about the degree of market
power since L  0 can occur under both competitive
and uncompetitive conditions. Additional informa-
tion would be required in this case. In both cases,
statistical tests for profit maximization (Varian 1984;
Love and Shumway 1994) can contribute to a correct
interpretation of the Lerner index; see Table 1.
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